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The National Security Presidency in the Post-9/11 World:  
The First Term of President Obama 
 




 Presidential power and its use is a topic that has been debated for as long as the 
Presidency has been in existence. In the realm of national security, the presidency has 
assumed more power and responsibility as time has progressed. The modern national 
security arrangement was created after World War II in order to address the challenges of 
the Cold War. After the fall of the Berlin Wall, threats to national security increasingly 
came from non-state actors such as terrorist organizations. However, it took the events of 
September 11, 2001 to galvanize the American people to support a War on Terror. The 
president at the time, George W. Bush, orchestrated a restructuring of the national 
security apparatus in order to deal with the threats from Al Qaeda and other affiliated 
groups. In addition, President Bush asserted additional powers through a variety of 
means. This had the effect of greatly expanding the power and the scope of the national 
security state and the national security presidency in particular. (Ellis 226-240) 
 In 2008, Barack Obama was a presidential candidate from a different political 
party who had espoused many views opposing the actions and policies of the Bush 
Administration. His victory was one of the most important tests of the new and improved 
national security presidency. How would President Obama grapple with the powers of the 
office? In many ways, that question was answered by his actions far more than his 
renowned rhetoric.  
 
II. Inherited Wars 
When fighting a war, it is important to note that presidents “do not begin from scratch 
but instead inherit a legacy of approaches from their predecessors.” (Nelson 502) When 
President Obama was inaugurated, he inherited the management of two wars from 
President Bush: Iraq and Afghanistan. In the new president’s view, Iraq was the “dumb 
war” while Afghanistan was the “good war.” Obama ended the “dumb war” by 
withdrawing U.S. troops from the country. At the same time, President Obama believed 
that President Bush had neglected the War in Afghanistan, and the Taliban had returned 
to being a significant threat once more. (Pfiffner 256)  
There are several key issues with the War in Afghanistan. First, it has long been 
known as the “Graveyard of Empires” because of the lack of success of most invading 
armies in the country. Afghanistan tends to be quite tribal, and central governments have 
rarely had success in exercising authority throughout the country. In fact, the current 
Afghan government lead by President Karzai is widely perceived as being corrupt, 
ineffective, and at times illegitimate. Many scholars agree that building effective Afghan 
security forces will be the key to stability in the long-term. Another key to victory would 
be to provide an arrangement where the Taliban would lay down their arms and be 
incorporated into the Afghan government. Considering that the Taliban used to rule 
Afghanistan under an authoritarian regime, this outcome could be quite unlikely. 
(Billitteri) 
President Obama was faced with a clear choice: escalate the war, attempt to maintain 
the status quo, or withdraw. After much deliberation within the Administration, Obama 
announced that he would order a surge of 30,000 troops into Afghanistan, but he would 
begin withdrawing combat forces in July 2011. After that point, responsibility would 
gradually be transferred to the Afghan government. This counterinsurgency strategy was 
quite similar to the one used to stabilize Iraq during the latter part of the Bush 
Administration. Polling data showed that more than half of Americans were in favor of a 
timetable, and less than 10% felt that the situation in Afghanistan was improving. 
However, some politicians felt that having the timetable would undermine the purpose of 
the surge. Even after classified documents released by Wikileaks showed that little 
progress had been made in the nine year war, Congress still voted for a military spending 
package including the surge of 30,000 troops. Despite some bipartisan opposition, the 
President received exactly what he wanted from Congress with bipartisan support. (Katel) 
After all, “Congress would not deny funds to embattled American forces lest it be 
accused of failing to support the troops….” (Nelson 493)  
Despite this surge, the war has continued to be a stalemate with diminishing prospects 
of victory. Even as President Obama has carried out a portion the troop withdrawal, the 
situation on the ground has become more difficult. Attempts to negotiate with the Taliban 
have not been successful. Desertion rates are high in the Afghan security forces, and 
about 89% of Afghan troops are illiterate. U.S. troops are showing signs of declining 
morale, and the high number of deployments and combat engagements has taken their toll 
on many. More Americans are turning against the war as it has progressed, and some 
politicians question whether it will turn into the next Vietnam. (Billitteri) One scary trend 
is the number of so-called “green-on-blue” attacks. This is where Afghan troops have 
shot and killed their U.S. trainers. This has led to suspensions of joint military operations 
between Afghan security forces and U.S. troops. These joint operations are vital to the 
training of the Afghan security forces. (“The Economist”) 
One of the key ironies of the War in Afghanistan is that the key sanctuaries for Al 
Qaeda and the Taliban are not found in that country. They are found in the lawless border 
region of Pakistan that is outside of the central government’s control. In order to 
overcome that obstacle, President Obama has ordered the increased use of drones on the 
battlefield. (Katel) 
 
III. Drones, Kill Lists, and the death of Osama bin Laden 
The Obama Administration has been fighting the War on Terror with a vigorous 
counterterrorism strategy. A new weapon on the battlefield known as drones or 
Unmanned Ariel Vehicles (UAV) has been a cornerstone in implementing this strategy. 
While the Bush Administration used these weapons as well, the Obama Administration 
has significantly increased their use in fighting Al Qaeda and the Taliban. In Pakistan 
alone, 45 drone strikes were ordered by the Bush Administration between 2004 and 2008 
while at least 117 have occurred in President Obama’s first term. However, the increased 
use of this technology is not without controversy. (Billitteri) 
There are several logical reasons why drones have been more heavily utilized. 
Drones are very effective at surveillance and assaults in regions that are difficult to reach. 
Many of these drone strikes are conducted in the lawless border regions of Pakistan and 
are used to directly kill terrorist leaders there. In some situations, it might be the only 
weapon available that can accomplish the objective. However, there are doubts about the 
effectiveness of drone strikes. One is that it is a tactic for short-term gains instead of 
being an overall strategy. In addition, it might increase support for terrorist groups in 
affected regions while deceased leaders are easily replaced. (Billitteri) 
There are several different ethical issues presented by the use of drones. First, the 
operators of the drones are ordering killings while safely sitting in an American military 
installation. In many ways, they are quite removed from the battlefield. This makes it far 
less difficult for the U.S. military to use lethal force without consequences. The positive 
side is that drone strikes save the lives of American soldiers and tend to be more precise 
than conventional bombing or artillery. However, the New America Foundation 
estimated that around one third of the victims of these strikes have killed innocent 
civilians who were not enemy combatants. In some instances, drones have been used to 
strike the funerals of previous drone strike victims. It is estimated that about 2% of the 
targets killed were high ranking leaders in Al Qaeda and other terrorist organizations. 
Many of the non-civilian targets have been low-level or mid-level terrorists. Also, these 
weapons have encountered various technical issues as well which can affect their 
performance on the battlefield. While the accuracy of drone strikes have improved, the 
overall increase in total drone strikes means that the amount of mistakes has increased as 
well. (Billitteri) 
 Many of the drone strikes have taken place within the borders of other nations 
which the U.S. is not at war with. Despite the fact that the Pakistani central government 
does not effectively control some of the regions where the strikes are taking place, that 
nation has become more resentful of this violation of its sovereignty as time has 
progressed. Some scholars of international law believe that all of these drone strikes 
violate international law for precisely that reason. Some of these strikes have also 
occurred far away from traditional combat zones, so it begs the question of whether the 
entire planet could be considered a combat zone. (Billitteri) 
 Another issue is in regards to the enemy combatants themselves. The United 
States has a history dating back to the Cold War in targeted killings and extrajudicial 
processes. While the Bush Administration conducted these targeting killings through 
drone strikes and other means, the Obama Administration has defended their legitimate 
use. In fact, they have expanded their use to include U.S. citizens Anwar Al-Awlaki, a 
senior leader of Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP). Who decides which 
individuals should be targeted? The obvious answer to that question is the Obama 
Administration, and they possess a secret “kill list” of such targets. (Pious 274-275, 
Billitteri)  
Harold Koh, the State Department’s legal advisor, has justified that the Obama 
Administration “may use force consistent with its inherent right to self-defense under 
international law” under the Authorization for Use of Force (AUMF) of 2001. (Koh) The 
Administration uses the principles of distinction and proportionality in deciding how 
drone strikes are carried out. Distinction “requires that attacks be limited to military 
objectives and that civilians or civilian objects shall not be the object of the attack.” 
(Koh) Proportionality “prohibits attacks that may be expected to cause incidental loss of 
civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof, that 
would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated.” 
(Koh) Claims that some drone strikes amount to extra-judicial killings are refuted by the 
following statement: “a state that is engaged in an armed conflict or in legitimate self-
defense is not required to provide targets with legal process before the state may use 
lethal force.” (Koh) Despite the reasoning given by the Obama Administration, drones 
can be clearly characterized as an offensive weapon that can violate the sovereignty of 
other nations with ease. If drones can violate national sovereignty as an act of self-
defense, the use of Seal Team 6 to kill Osama Bin Laden would be a natural evolution of 
this line of thought.  
The killing of Al Qaeda leader Osama Bin Laden by U.S. military forces and CIA 
operatives was perhaps the most memorable actions taken by the Obama Administration. 
However, the strike occurred deep inside of Pakistani territory. In many ways, it is a 
logical next step from the use of drone strikes across national boundaries. The primary 
difference was in the use of Seal Team 6 instead of drones to carry out the operation. 
 
IV. Detainees, Trials, and Guantanamo Bay 
Some of the most important campaign promises made by President Obama were on 
the subject of detainees held by the Bush Administration. The detention facility at 
Guantanamo Bay was viewed as a stain on the reputation of the United States due to the 
activities conducted there. On his second day, he signed an executive order stating that 
the detention center would be closed within one year or earlier if practicable. (Pfiffner 
249)  
Another executive order banned “enhanced interrogation techniques” from being used 
by the CIA as well as humane treatment of prisoners under the Geneva Conventions. He 
confined interrogation practices to what is laid out in the Army Field Manual. This anti-
torture executive order was largely successful in implementation. (Pfiffner 249) At the 
same time, the Obama Administration has shielded many former Bush Administration 
officials and agents from prosecution on the grounds of torture conducted in the past. 
(Pyle 867-880) 
Attorney General Eric Holder had the desire to go farther with a liberal policy agenda 
which included trying terrorists in Article III courts. Holder believed that the Article III 
courts were the best venue to try terrorists because they are far more established and 
tested when compared to military commissions. In addition, European nations might be 
more willing to extradite terrorists to the U.S. if they were certain that due process would 
be guaranteed. Holder was able to convince President Obama to delegate the power to 
execute this strategy to him, and he acted soon enough. On Christmas Day 2009, Umar 
Farouk Abdulmutallab was captured trying to blow up an airplane with a bomb in his 
underpants. Despite strong criticism from Republicans, he decided to prosecute him in a 
criminal court anyway. Then, he went a step farther when he decided to prosecute 9/11 
mastermind Khalid Sheikh Mohammed (KSM) in federal court. It was to happen in New 
York City because that was where the alleged crime occurred. (Pfiffner 249-251) 
The KSM trial did not happen because there was an enormous backlash from the 
public. It is important to note that Holder was not the only person advising the president 
on these issues. Several of the key White House political advisors, especially Chief of 
Staff Rahm Emanuel, favored a more conservative and politically sensitive approach 
from the beginning. He did not want these national security issues to endanger the 
Administration’s domestic policy agenda. The political pressure applied in particular by 
Senators Lindsey Graham, John McCain, and Joseph Lieberman was so great that the 
Obama Administration backed down. Graham offered to help the Administration with the 
closure of Guantanamo Bay if they backed down on the KSM trial. That also factored 
into both Obama’s and Emanuel’s calculus. (Pfiffner 252)   
If Guantanamo Bay was closed, a similar facility would have to be set up in a 
different location for the remaining detainees. (Jost) In fact, Bagram Air Base in 
Afghanistan is being used as an alternative site to hold new detainees from multiple 
countries. This site makes it easier to resist Habeas Corpus petitions.  (Pyle 877) Even so, 
the primary replacement facility would probably have to be within the United States, and 
a state prison in Illinois was considered as a possible option. Despite Senator Graham’s 
offer, Congress passed a provision of a defense authorization bill banning any 
Guantanamo Bay detainees from entering the United States. The President reluctantly 
signed the bill into law. This has the effect of removing civilian trials as an option 
because those trials would be held within the U.S. Military commissions, the more 
politically favored way of handling terrorists at the time, became the venue of choice. 
(Jost)  
Guantanamo Bay will be open for the foreseeable future, but the Obama 
Administration has taken certain steps to manage the situation. They have transferred at 
least 67 detainees to other countries out of the 240 held when he took office. A review 
board consisting of six representatives from the State Department, the Department of 
Defense, the Justice Department, the Department of Homeland Security, the Director of 
National Intelligence, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff was set up to review all detainees that 
cannot be tried in a court or released. So far, 48 detainees have fallen into this category. 
Even though this is an improvement in process, the Obama Administration is still 
allowing indefinite detention of detainees at Guantanamo Bay. The executive order 
written to close Guantanamo Bay did not succeed. (Jost)   
 
V. Libya 
As the Arab Spring unfolded, many regimes in the Middle East and North Africa 
came under threat. In some cases, the government fell quickly and without significant 
outside intervention. That was not the case in Libya where Dictator Mummar Qaddafi 
fought his opposition quite ruthlessly. In response, the United Nations Security Council 
eventually passed Resolution 1973 which authorized a ban on all fights made by the 
Libyan government in order to protect civilians. However, this resolution prohibited the 
use of ground forces in Libyan territory. (Fisher 177-178) 
Initially, President Obama informed Congress that the U.S. would only have a limited 
role in the enforcement of this resolution. As the situation unfolded, it became clear that 
regime change in Libya was the primary goal. In addition to enforcing the resolution, 
U.S. military forces deployed weapons including drones to destroy ground targets not 
associated with Libya’s air capabilities. In effect, these actions exceeded the authority of 
Resolution 1973. (Fisher 178) 
Under the U.S. Constitution, Congress has the power to declare war instead of the 
President. Since World War II, it has been quite common for the U.S. to not formally 
declare war against an enemy. At times, Congress has passed an authorization to use 
military force in these kinds of situations. In regards to the Libya situation, Congress took 
no such action. Instead, the Obama Administration asserted that the UN Resolution 1973 
was their authorization for taking action in Libya. Then, they transferred control over the 
operation to NATO where the U.S. would play a supporting role. NATO does not operate 
independently and receives a large degree of support from the United States. (Fisher 178, 
183) 
There is one law passed by Congress which addresses this kind of situation: the War 
Powers Resolution.  This law was a response to some of the issues surrounding the 
Vietnam War as well as President Nixon’s unilateral bombing campaign in Cambodia. It 
was passed after overcoming a veto from President Nixon. Under the War Powers 
Resolution, the President is required to notify Congress within 48 hours of “committing 
troops to combat” as well as bring American troops home after 60 days if Congress has 
not authorized the use of military force. Nixon insisted that this act was unconstitutional, 
and many presidents after have disregarded the legislation. (Ellis 233-234) The War 
Powers Act also prevents the use of treaties as a substitute for Congressional 
authorization. Therefore, the U.N. Charter does not give the U.N the authority to declare 
war for the United States. (Fisher 179-180) 
Interestingly enough, President Obama did report to Congress on the use of military 
force in Libya within the prescribed 48 hour deadline of the War Powers Act. However, 
the conflict lasted longer than the 60 days allowed by the law without an authorization 
from Congress to use force. Under the law, the president would have been required to 
withdraw all military forces from the conflict within the 30 days after the 60 day period. 
That did not happen. The Libya intervention continued with U.S. support until NATO 
operation concluded. (Fisher 178-183) 
  
VI. Analysis and Conclusions 
Obama was the candidate of hope and change. He is also a Nobel Prize winner, 
and a former constitutional law professor. In regards to national security, continuity is a 
better term than change to describe his actions and policies. Christopher Pyle of Mount 
Holyoke College believes that President Obama “is squarely in the Nixon-Bush tradition 
of presidential power.” (Pyle 867) Throughout his first term, several themes continue to 
persist.     
Many voters probably assumed that President Obama would reign in the powers 
assumed by the Bush Administration. However, President Obama is very much a 
continuation of this trend towards a stronger national security presidency. Why is this? 
Richard Pious of Columbia University may have the answer: 
In the post 9/11 America, the president is expected to be protector in chief. No 
president can afford to disappoint the American people. The prospect of more 
terrorist attacks, let alone the possibility of the use of weapons of mass destruction 
by terrorists on American soil, raises the stakes for each president and his 
administration. (Pious 284) 
In the Cold War, the President was responsible to protect the American people from 
Communism. These days, it is to protect the American people from terrorism. A 
President’s reputation in this area is crucial to keeping this issue off the table in the 
national discourse. Obama knew that he could probably count on support from the left 
because they had nowhere else to go. He could give them symbolic victories such as the 
executive orders reversing Bush Administration policies. At the same time, moving to the 
center on national security issues would soften opposition from the right. (Pious 284-284) 
No President wants to be called soft on terrorism. Such effective accusations could easily 
sink a president’s reelection efforts, especially for a Democrat. For Obama, the killing of 
Osama Bin Laden decisively strengthened his reputation on national security. Other 
actions such as drone strikes serve a similar purpose.   
The National Security Presidency has become far more powerful relative to the other 
two branches of the federal government. The Obama Presidency has proved once again 
that Congress does not have powerful leverage over the president in many cases.  
Congress approved funding for Obama’s Afghan surge, and the War Powers Act did not 
stop the president from ordering a military intervention in Libya. Drone strikes and covert 
actions in other nations are further examples of the power to launch a unilateral attack 
anywhere in the world. If “deployment is destiny,”(Nelson 493) then drone deployments 
might represent the future of U.S. military conflicts in the War on Terror and beyond.  
A primary source of presidential power comes from the executive order. Executive 
orders are presidential directives that shape how the president’s powers are enacted. They 
are “both powerful and constrained” and have the “force of law.” (Nelson 473-474) In the 
absence of legislation from Congress or a court ruling, the power to undo an executive 
action implies the power to take such as action. It is interesting to note that President 
Obama attempted to use the power of executive orders to undo unilateral executive 
actions taken by the Bush Administration. A future president could have the authority to 
issue executive orders to the excesses of both Presidents Bush and Obama just as he or 
she could reject those excesses entirely. (Nelson 474, 483)  
There will always be a temptation to abuse power wherever it exists. As an aide to 
President Kennedy said, “Everybody believes in democracy-until they get to the White 
House.” (Nelson 482) At the end of the day, this comes down to an issue of trust. Do we 
trust our president to use power judiciously? Hopefully, the American people will 
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